While there is an extensive literature on intergenerational transmission of economic outcomes (education, health and income for example), many of the pathways through which these outcomes are transmitted are not as well understood. We address this deficit by analysing the relationship between socio-economic status and child outcomes in university, based on a rich and unique dataset of university students. While large socioeconomic differences in academic performance exist at the point of entry into university, these differences are substantially narrowed during the period of study. Importantly, the differences across socioeconomic backgrounds in university grade attainment for female students is explained by intermediating variables such as personality, risk attitudes and time preferences, and subject/college choices. However, for male students, we explain less than half of the socioeconomic gradient through these same pathways. Despite the weakening socio-economic effect in grade attainment, a key finding is that large socioeconomic differentials in the earnings expectations of university students persist, even when controlling for grades in addition to our rich set of controls. Our findings pose a sizable challenge for policy in this area as they suggest that equalising educational outcomes may not translate into equal labour market outcomes.
Introduction
The intergenerational transmission of education and income is a key concern of education economists and policymakers, with a substantial body of literature demonstrating high correlations between parental education and child education (Black and Devereux 2010; Ermisch and Del Bono 2010; Machin and Murphy 2010) . For example, the elasticity of child education with respect to parental education has been shown to be of the order of 0.3 to 0.5 in the largest meta-analysis conducted to date (Hertz et al. 2007 ). However, these estimates do not examine the extent to which parental education influences grade performance within education attainment levels, or the expected economic return to education.
In this paper we investigate the interaction between socio-economic status and higher education from matriculation to graduation. We provide new estimates of the magnitude of the intergenerational relationship between parental education and both grade performance in university and the expected return from university education. Furthermore, we go further than much current research in examining the channels through which these transmissions occur by estimating detailed decompositions of these intergenerational relationships. Along with standard demographic variables, our decomposition allows for intergenerational transmission through choice of institute, subject choice, pre-university academic performance and a wide range of personality traits. There is a growing literature incorporating character controls into economic models (Borghans et al. 2008) , moreover, there is evidence that personality traits are transmitted from parent to child (Dohmen et al. 2006; Goldsmith et al. 1994) . In our decomposition analysis we contribute to this literature by examining whether personality traits constitute one of the pathways through which intergenerational transmission of education outcomes occurs.
Firstly, we examine whether university entry mechanisms (where secondary (high) school exam results are used to allocate places) are predictive of university performance controlling for socio-economic status (SES), allowing us to determine whether the university admission system is based upon academic aptitude or the ability of wealthy families to confer educational advantage onto their children (Sackett et al., 2009 ). Secondly, we examine the magnitude of the socio-economic attainment gaps in university, and the extent to which these differentials are mitigated through choice of institute, subject choice, prior academic attainment or character traits. We analyse the extent to which the university system itself contributes to increasing (or decreasing) socioeconomic attainment gaps among college students by comparing the attainment gap at entry to college attainment differences. Thirdly, a large body of literature shows that earnings expectations can both be meaningfully elicited (e.g. Dominitz and Manski 1996) and predictive of later salaries (Webbink and Hartog 2004) , but there is a socioeconomic gradient in these earnings expectations and in the perceived economic returns to education (Smith and Powell 1990) . We examine in detail whether this socio-economic gradient in expectations of the returns from education can be explained through pathways such as choice of institute, subject choice, grade attainment in university or character traits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contextualizes the Irish education system. Section 3 outlines details of the data used in the study and provides information on various measures used in the analysis. Section 4 outlines the econometric methodology used and reports the findings from the three key research questions outlined above and Section 5 concludes.
Context -Irish Education System in Brief
The Irish education system is split into primary education (elementary), secondary education (high-school) and tertiary (higher & further) education. Primary and secondary education is provided by the State, and while some students attend private fee paying schools the vast majority attend state funded schools. Students typically attend primary school from the age of 4 to 12, and attend secondary school from the age of 12 to 18. While there is a minimum school leaving age of 16 (and an intermediate examination taken at around this age known as the Junior Certificate, akin to the GCSE/O-Level examination in the United Kingdom), for the majority of the age cohort (84.7%), the culmination of secondary education is a set of national exams called the Leaving Certificate which are taken in the final year of secondary school. 1 Seven universities and 15 institutes of technology provide the bulk of tertiary education in Ireland. 2, 3 Following reforms introduced in 1995, undergraduate education is funded by the State so there is no direct tuition fee for participants. 4 The admission rate to higher education in Ireland in 2004 was 55 percent, and, despite the reforms that abolished direct tuition fees, significant socio-economic gradients in participation exist (O'Connell et al. 2006; Denny 2010) . There is some evidence of a softening of this gradient -in 1998, some 23 percent of higher education participants came from semi-skilled/unskilled background, whereas this increased to 40 percent by 2004 (O'Connell et al. 2006 . Much of this participation, however, reflects an increase in the number of places in institutes of technology (which have a much broader socio-economic representation).
Places on courses in all higher education institutions are blind allocated based on
Leaving Certificate results and managed by an independent agency (the Central Applications Office There are also seven teacher-training colleges, one pontifical college, one college of art and design and one college that provides business related qualifications. 4 However, there is a 'Student Services Fee' (or registration fee) of up to €1,500 paid by the student each year. 5 See www.cao.ie also apply separately for up to ten sub-degree (diploma/certificate) courses, also in order of preference.
Typically, students take seven subjects in the Leaving Certificate, and the grades are converted into points (e.g. A1 = 100 points, A2 = 90 points, etc.). The top six subjects are summed resulting in a Leaving Certificate 'point score' of between 0 and 600. Each degree, diploma and certificate course has a point threshold which is a function of the number of places available and the achieved grades of the applicants -specifically, a course with N places would have a points threshold equal to the actual score of the N th applicant (ordered from highest scoring to lowest scoring) for the particular course of study. If a student achieves above the points threshold for their first choice they are offered this course. If they do not get enough points for their first choice they are offered the next choice on their list for which they do have enough points. The preference ordering is adhered to strictly -a student can move up the list (i.e. move from their second to first preference course is a places become available) but never downwards. 6 Gormley and Murphy (2006) provide a strong overview of this system, in particular the nature of the points system.
Data and Measurement
This analysis is based on two surveys of students registered at all seven Irish universities that were conducted by the authors on behalf of the Irish University Association as part of the Irish Universities Study (IUS). 7 The earlier round of the survey (IUS1), which was carried out between January and June 2009, is used to analyse student's earnings expectations, given the rich battery of personality measures available in that round. The more recent round of the survey (IUS2), which was carried out between December 2009 and April 2010, is used to estimate the relationship between grade attainment in university and socio-economic status.
6 If a student applies for both Level 8 and Level 6/Level 7 courses they can receive two offers. There are some alternative entry routes in university, such as access programmes or mature student entry. 7 The two institutions in Northern Ireland (Queen's University of Belfast and the University of Ulster) are not included in our sample.
In both rounds, from the total university student undergraduate population in Ireland of approximately 73000 students, 22 percent (16000 students) were randomly sampled. 8 The response rate of those undergraduate students randomly sampled was 13.4 percent and 18.7 respectively in IUS1 and IUS2. In addition, 3000 undergraduate students who had responded to earlier survey rounds were invited to participate in the more recent round of the survey (IUS2). The response rate for this follow-up cohort was 34.1 percent.
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Focus groups conducted in the universities indicated that many students who were selected into the survey do not actively use their University email account. In addition, some students admitted to routinely not opening e-mails from the university plenary (who contacted them to request participation) or complained of survey saturation. Therefore, we believe our 'true' response rate is somewhat higher than the actual rate (if we base the rate on the sample actually successfully contacted).
TABLE 1 HERE
However, given the relatively low response rate, there is a possibility of sampling bias because the students who actually received the survey and made the choice to participate may come from non-random backgrounds. In order to explore the potential size and impact of these sources of sampling bias we compared observables in the survey to that of population statistics (gender, college and main subject area). outcomes were presented to the respondent in bands of €10,000 for short run expectations and in bands of €20,000 for long run expectations -short run options ranged from €0 to greater than €100,000, and long run options ranged from €0 to greater than €200,000. In the estimating sample, the mean (calculated by taking a linear approximation through the midpoint of the bands) of the short run earnings expectations is €32,104 and the mean of the longrun earnings expectations is €103,838.
Parental education is reported in the data in terms of qualifications attained. We convert this into years of education by approximating the years of education necessary to obtain the reported qualification, e.g. primary school education is considered equivalent to eight years of completed education. This variable ranges from eight years of education to 19 years of education (for completing a PhD). In most of our analysis, paternal and maternal years of completed education are summed to provide a single measure. The distribution of parental education is shown in Figure 1 (drawn from IUS2).
FIGURE 1 HERE
Descriptive statistics of other control variables are also shown in Table 2 . Mean reported Leaving Certificate points are 468 in the both the estimating samples of IUS1 and IUS2. A number of well-validated and widely used character measures are used in this analysis. For a review of the use of personality measures in economics see Borghans et al. (2008) . Risk willingness was measured by asking students to report, on a scale of 0-10, how willing they were to take risks in general, where higher values indicate higher risk willingness. Dohmen et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence that this measure of risk willingness is predictive of risk-taking behaviour, and that it outperforms other measures of risk preferences. Mean risk willingness is 6.01 in IUS2 and 6.47 in IUS1. In our analysis we also control for the future orientation of students. This was measured by using a subset of the questions from the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) scale (Strathman et al. 1994 -for question wording see Appendix 1). Students responded to four questions relating to how they think about the future, and reported on a five-point scale. These four responses are summed, yielding a variable that ranges between 4 and 20 with higher values indicating higher levels of future orientation. The CFC variable has a mean of 13.72 in IUS2 and 13.53 in IUS1. Finally, in the earnings expectations data set (IUS1), students were asked the Ten Item Personality Inventory (Gosling et al. 2003) , a shortened version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI) personality scale -see Appendix 1 for question wording.
14,15 Through ten questions, the TIPI scale measures the following five personality traits; extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness on a scale of between 2 and 14.
The mean values of these five traits were extraversion (9.28); agreeableness (6.21);
conscientiousness (10.23); neuroticism (6.68); and openness (10.77).
Model and Results
Our basic model of the impact of parental background on the university outcomes of their children is:
(1)
where P is our measure of student outcome (performance in their degree programme or, in later specifications, their expectation of future income). This is a function of parental SES (S); E, an (i x j) matrix of characteristics of the institution and course attended (for example, 14 Gosling et al. (2003) test the TIPI, and found that this personality scale performs well in terms of convergent and discriminate correlations with the BFI, test-retest reliability and external correlates. 15 The Big Five Inventory personality scale was developed by a number of researchers including Allport & Odbert (1936) , Tupes & Christal (1961) , Norman (1963) and Goldberg (1981) .
year of study, subject and college choice); and X, an (i x k) matrix of characteristics of the student (gender, age, personality measures, etc).
In much of the analysis we report the results in the form of decompositions. This follows a long tradition in the empirical literature, notably work by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) . We follow the process outlined by Bowles & Gintis (2002) , who decompose intergenerational income correlation into the direct and indirect effects of parental income on child income. The indirect effect is the proportion of the total effect that is transmitted through intermediating variables (e.g. education choices or personality traits). The direct effect is the remainder of the total effect that can not be explained by intermediating variables.
This approach is based upon the total derivative formula;
where j = 1,2..m. In this formulation, the total effect dy/dz (the total derivative of y with respect to z) is made up of a direct effect, δy/δz (the partial derivative of y with respect to z), and an indirect effect,  j δy/δx j *(dx j /dz), the partial derivatives of y with respect to x j multiplied by the derivative of x j with respect to z summed.
We can use this approach to decompose the transmission of SES (measured by parental education) to grade attainment and earnings expectations into a direct effect and an indirect effect. Applying the formulation in (2b) to (1), and suppressing individual subscripts for ease of notation, gives
which decomposes the transmission of parental education to child outcomes into a direct component, and an indirect component from each of the j education variables and the k individual characteristics. If parental education is correlated with education variables (such as subject or college choice), and/or individual characteristics of the student (such as risk preferences, future orientation or personality), and if these factors predict child outcomes, then parental education will have an indirect effect through these variables. To construct confidence intervals around the direct and indirect estimates, we use bootstrapped, biascorrected standard errors, as recommended in the literature (Shrout and Bolger 2002) .
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INSERT TABLE 3 Based on (1), Table 3 displays the results of an OLS regression of university grades on
Leaving Certificate points, gender and age. As can be seen, Leaving Certificate points are highly significant (p-value < 0.01). On average, an extra 100 Leaving Certificate points increase university grade by approximately 3 percent. As outlined above, if the relationship between Leaving Certificate performance and grade attainment in university is robust to the addition of SES controls, then this is an indication that the current admissions system is based upon academic aptitude rather than simply being a reflection of socio-economic status. As can be seen in column 2 of Table 3 , the relationship between university grade and Leaving
Certificate points is robust to the addition of SES controls. Controlling for combined parental education has very little effect on the Leaving Certificate coefficient, in fact the coefficient on Leaving Certificate point increases (0.031 compared to 0.035), and the coefficient remains highly significant (p-value < 0.01).
INSERT TABLE 4
Turning to the impact of parental education on university grades, the output in Table 4 shows a statistically significant but modest coefficient. 17 An additional year of parental education increases grade on average by 0.10 of a percentage point, which, while statistically significant (p-value < 0.1), is a small result. However, the relationship between parental education and grade performance in university is much stronger for male students (column 2)
with an additional year of parental education associated with an increase of 0. and subject choice actually favour low SES students (contributes -70% to the pooled differential, but is not statistically significant (p-value > 0.1)). Low SES students are studying at colleges and are choosing subjects that, all else being equal, would give them higher grades than high SES students.
Demographics also favour low SES students, since the partial derivatives of gender and age with respect to grade are both positive, and low SES students are more likely to be female and older. (Age contributes -21% (p-value < 0.01) to the differential and gender contributes -1% but is statistically insignificant (p-value > 0.1)). Risk willingness also favours low SES students (contributes -10% (p-value < 0.05) to the pooled differential), since high SES students have higher risk preferences, and risk preferences have a negative partial derivative with respect to grade. Finally, year of study and future orientation do not make a large contribution in explaining the differential (they explain 1% and 5% of the pooled differential respectively and neither is significant). In columns 2 and 3 we analyse the decomposition separately for male and female students. For male students, less than half (43%) of the differential is explained by the control variables, whereas for females the total differential is explained. In fact, females actually experience a negative direct (but insignificant) intergenerational transmission of grade attainment (-0.036; p-value > 0.1) when controlling for this set of variables (i.e. controlling for these variables, higher SES female students are performing worse in university).
INSERT TABLE 5 In Table 5 , the transmission of grade attainment is examined separately for maternal and paternal education. A similar picture emerges, with a large direct transmission from both maternal and paternal education to grade attainment for males (0.22 and 0.12 respectively, although neither are statistically significant), but not for females (-0.06 and -0.01 respectively, again, neither are significant). For male students, the direct effect of maternal education is nearly twice as large as the direct effect of paternal education. We also decompose the grade differential using maximum parental education, a specification which allows for the inclusion of one-parent families. This decomposition yields quantitatively similar results and is shown in the Appendix 2 (Table A2-3).   INSERT TABLE 6   Table 6 compares the socio-economic gradient in university with the socio-economic gradient in entry-level scores (Leaving Certificate points). The standardized SES coefficient from the model of Leaving Certificate points is 0.06 (p-value < 0.01) and the corresponding figure for the regression of university attainment is 0.01 (p-value < 0.1), indicating that the SES gradient in secondary school is approximately 6 times greater than the gradient that exists in university, for the group of students who matriculate. When this is estimated separately for males and females, the dissipation of the SES gradient is much larger for females. The male gradient in university is only 3 times smaller than that in secondary school, whereas the female gradient is 18 times smaller. These results imply that the SES gradient in academic performance dissipates to a large extent in university particularly for female students.
INSERT TABLE 7   Table 7 decomposes the relationship between parental education and short-run earnings expectations for the full sample as well as separately for males and females.
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Parental education has a significant and substantial total effect on both short-run and long-run earnings expectations. An additional year of parental education increases short run earnings expectations on average by €188 (p-value < 0.01). The magnitude of the total impact of an additional year of parental education on short run earnings expectations is similar for males and females, although it is not statistically significant for males (an additional year of parental education is associated with €142 (p-value > 0.1) and €190 (p-value < 0.05) higher short run earnings expectations for male and female students respectively).
The vast majority of the socioeconomic gradient (100% in the pooled decomposition; p-value < 0.01) is explainable by the intermediating variables. As in the grade attainment decomposition, the most important factor in explaining the differential is Leaving Certificate points (explains 60% of the pooled differential; p-value < 0.01). This is due to the positive Partial derivatives corresponding to Table 7 are shown in Table A2 -4 of the Appendix, and total derivatives in Table A2-5 0.1 and 8%; p-value < 0.05 respectively), age favours low SES students (-6%; p-value < 0.1).
The five different personality measures contribute differently to the differential, but none are statistically significant (extraversion 7%; agreeableness 2%; conscientiousness -5%; neuroticism 1%; openness 0%). Future orientation does not contribute towards explaining the SES differential in short-run earnings expectations (0%; p-value > 0.1). Interestingly, grade attainment does not significantly contribute towards explaining the SES short-run earnings expectations (1%; p-value > 0.1).
INSERT TABLE 8 Table 8 shows this decomposition separately for maternal and paternal education, but the results give the same quantitative conclusions. Maternal and paternal education increase short-run earnings expectations for male students, although the estimates are not statistically significant (€206; p-value > 0.1 and €197; p-value > 0.1 respectively for maternal and paternal education) and for female students (€288; p-value < 0.1 and €290; p-value < 0.05 respectively). Again, most of this differential (between 51% and 74%) can be explained by differences in Leaving Certificate performance.
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INSERT TABLE 9 Table 9 shows the decomposition of the relationship between parental education and long run earnings expectations. 20 An additional year of parental education increases long run earnings expectations on average by €2241 (p-value < 0.01). Again, the magnitude of the estimated total impact is similar for males and females (€1980 and €2203 respectively), with both estimates being highly significant (p-values < 0.01). Much less of the total effect between parental education and earnings expectations can be explained in the long run 19 We also decompose the short run earnings expectations differential using maximum parental education; this decomposition yields quantitatively similar results and is shown in the Appendix 2 (Table A2-6) . 20 Partial derivatives corresponding to Table 9 are shown in Table A2 -6 of the Appendix, and total derivatives in Table A2-5. compared to the short run. In the long run, just over half (51%; p-value < 0.01) of the total differential can be explained through intermediating variables. Slightly more of the male differential is explained compared to the female differential (57%; p-value < 0.05 versus 42%; p-value < 0.01). The most important factors in explaining the differential are again Leaving
Certificate points (27% of the pooled differential; p-value < 0.01) and college and subject choice (12% of the pooled differential; p-value > 0.1), although this contribution is not statistically significant.
As in the short run decomposition, gender and risk preferences significantly contribute to explaining the long run differential (5%, p-value < 0.05 and 2%; p-value < 0.05 respectively). In the long run, the personality trait extraversion is statistically significant in explaining the differential (2%; p-value < 0.05), with this trait being particularly important in the female decomposition (3%; p-value < 0.05 compared to 1%; p-value > 0.1 for males).
The partial derivative of extraversion with respect to long run earnings expectations is significant and positive, and high SES students are more likely to classify themselves as being extraverted. None of the other four personality traits make a large contribution in explaining the differential (contributions are all  |1%| and insignificant), nor does future orientation (0%; p-value > 0.1), age (-1%; p-value > 0.1), year of study (1%, p-value > 0.1) or grade (1%, p-value > 0.1). Table 10 shows the decomposition separately for parental and maternal education.
21
INSERT TABLE 10
Conclusion
This paper analyses the interaction between socio-economic status and higher education, focusing on the entry mechanism into higher education, the academic performance of students in university, and finally, the expected future returns from attending university. The paper 21 The long run decomposition using maximum parental education is shown in Table A2 -7 of Appendix 2.
also analyses the various mechanisms through which intergenerational transmissions of grade attainment and expected earnings occur, using detailed decompositions that incorporate personality measures, institutional and subject choice, and prior academic performance.
The current university admissions process was found to be predictive of academic performance in university, and the relationship is robust to the addition of SES controls. This is an indication that the current admissions system is efficient in allocating places in university based on academic aptitude. A small, but significant and positive, gradient was observed between academic achievement in university and SES -on average, 10 years of additional combined parental education is associated with a one-percentage point higher university grade outcome. The relationship between SES and grade attainment in university is much stronger for males than for females. Additionally, maternal education level is more important than paternal education level in predicting educational attainment in university for male students. Comparison of this socio-economic gradient to the gradient that exists prior to university entry suggests any observed penalty declines significantly over the course of the student's time at University, particularly for female students. We do not find much evidence that SES differences in personality traits, such as risk preferences or conscientiousness, contribute to explaining socio-economic differentials in grade performance.
Importantly, despite the lack of robust evidence of a persistent socio-economic penalty during university, there is a large, significant and persistent differential in terms of the earnings expectations of different socio-economic cohorts. The difference in long-run expected earnings is €2,241 per year of additional parental education, or approximately two percent of the long-run expected income level. Given an average return of approximately eight percent to higher education (Walker and Zhu 2003) , the expected earnings return from parental education is around 25 percent of the actual individual return from higher education.
While some of this differential is mediated by our extensive set of demographic, education and personality controls, nearly half of the total effect persists as a direct or unexplained effect.
This differential might be interpreted as evidence that low SES students are anticipating discrimination upon entry into the labour market, or alternatively are genuinely underestimating their returns. This poses a problem for policy makers trying to equalise education attainment across socio-economic cohorts -students make educational choices partly based upon the expected returns from education, and since low SES students have lower expected returns from higher education, unequal participation of low SES cohorts in higher education may reflect rational behaviour on their part based on their own expectations.
A further issue is that lowered earnings expectations might result in lower realised earnings due to self-fulfilling expectations. Since we control for grade attainment in our analysis, our findings suggest that even if educational attainment is equalised across socio-economic groups, labour market outcomes may not be equalised.
An important direction for further research is to examine the extent to which expectations are self-fulfilling and the extent to which this can explain intergenerational transmission of income, or whether they are a function of anticipated discrimination in the labour market. The results of this paper rule out many traditional explanations of why lower SES students would expect to earn less but still leaves open the possibility that they are rationally embedding labour market discrimination or other unobserved labour market disadvantages into their expectations. In countries with increasing college participation, such effects take on increasing relevance in examining the processes of intergenerational transmission and social mobility. Note: This table shows the results from a number of grade decompositions. The first column estimates the decomposition for the entire sample. The second column estimates the same model for male students only and the final column estimates the model for female students only. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications. In all decompositions, the first stage total effect of SES on gender is estimated using a linear probability model. As college and subject are categorical, estimation of individual college or subject contributions are not estimated. The combined effects of college and subject choice are estimated as the residual of the total effect less the direct effect and the sum of the other indirect effects. Note: This table shows the results from a number of grade decompositions. The first column uses father's education level as the explanatory variable. The second column estimates the same model but uses mother's education level as the explanatory variable. Columns 3-6 estimate these two model specifications separately for male and female respondents. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications. Note: This table shows the results from a number of decompositions of short run earnings expectations. The first column estimates the decomposition for the entire sample. The second column estimates the same model for male students only and the final column estimates the model for female students only. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications. Note: This table shows the results from a number of decompositions of short run earnings expectations. The first column uses father's education level as the explanatory variable. The second column estimates the same model but uses mother's education level as the explanatory variable. Columns 3-6 estimate these two model specifications separately for male and female respondents. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications. Note: This table shows the results from a number of decompositions of long run earnings expectations. The first column uses father's education level as the explanatory variable. The second column estimates the same model but uses mother's education level as the explanatory variable. Columns 3-6 estimate these two model specifications separately for male and female respondents. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications.
Consideration of Future Consequences Question Wording
The response scale for this question was: 1 Extremely uncharacteristic 2 Somewhat uncharacteristic 3 Uncertain 4 Somewhat characteristic 5 Extremely characteristic "For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you a) I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my day to day behaviour b) Often I engage in a particular behaviour in order to achieve outcomes that may not result for many years c) I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself d) My behaviour is only influenced by the immediate i.e. a matter of days or weeks"
TIPI Question Wording
The response scale for this question was: Note: This table shows the results from a number of earnings expectations decomposition. The first column estimates the decomposition of first salary expectations for the entire sample using maximum parental education as the SES variable. The second column estimates the same model and also controls for belonging to a one parent family. The 3 rd and 4 th columns decompose maximum salary expectations. Standard errors were computed using bootstrapped estimation with 2000 replications. 
Appendix 3

